RosenbergBPDisasterResearchAnnotation5

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. "Chapter 3." U.S. Department of the Interior, 11 Jan. 2011. Web. 13 Feb. 2011.  1. ** ** Full citation. **

** 2. Where does the author work, what else has s/he written about, and what are her/his credentials? **  Although specific authors are not provided for the piece, the list of commission members ( []) provides a picture of the types of experts who likely contributed. Among the places of current employment are the Natural Resources Defense Council, the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, the National Geographic Society, the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, and TPG Capital. In the past, some of these individuals have been engaged in projects including the publishing of a guide to participatory citizenship, assessing the long-term environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas development, and the implementation of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration Plan. The credentials of the committee members are significant, comprising a former senator, former president of the World Wildlife Fund and EPA, a Professor of Marine Science and Vice Chancellor for Environmental Sustainability, and a member of the Special Committee on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Claims Settlement.

** 3. What is the main topic or argument of the text? ** The piece primarily suggests that the revenue generation incentive for agencies such as the Mineral Management Service had taken priority over those of safety and environmental protection in the regulatory regime leading up to the BP Oil Spill.

** 4. Describe at least three ways that the main topic or argument is fleshed out. ** The argument described above is initially presented within the context of the historical framework of regulation of the oil industry within the United States. This includes the beginning practices of leasing, in addition to the rise of environmental laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act in response to accidents such as the Santa Barbara spill in 1969. The piece then segues into an account of the creation and development of the Mineral Management Service since 1982, including its precipitous decline in budget through 1996, and the reluctance of the agency to act in enforcing these pieces of environmental legislation as the industry began to grow at a pace faster than that at which regulators could maintain oversight. The last portion of the chapter delves into how the MMS failed specifically in the case of the Macondo Well, and cites specific instances of legislation which were not properly upheld in the process of reviewing and licensing the drilling operations which led to the BP Oil Spill of 2010.

** 5. What three quotes capture the critical import of the text? ** 1) “From birth, MMS had a built-in incentive to promote offshore drilling in sharp tension with its mandate to ensure safe drilling and environmental protection.”

2) “MMS became an agency systematically lacking the resources, technical training, or experience in petroleum engineering that is absolutely critical to ensuring that offshore drilling is being conducted in a safe and responsible manner.”

3) “With the dramatic increase in oil prices over the previous decade, royalties and revenues from federal oil and gas resources had already become the second largest revenue source for the U.S. Treasury. (A September 1980 lease sale in New Orleans had demonstrated the sums potentially at stake, bringing in a record $2.8 billion of cash bonuses, far more than any prior lease sale; see Chapter 2.) Clearly, this was a consequential way to secure revenue without needing to raise taxes.”

Although federal legislation concerning offshore drilling plays a major role in the oversight process, it is ultimately the ability of the agency charged with implementing these policies that determines their success or lack thereof. As a result of both internal and external pressures, ranging from cuts in the agency’s budget to a lack of technical expertise among its staff, the Mineral Management Service ultimately became more concerned with revenue maximization than protection of the environment and safety of the well. The warped incentives present, as well as the lack of accountability for the MMS, depict a fundamentally flawed regulatory regime which likely requires a significant overhaul to regain dexterity moving forward.
 * 6. Explain how the argument and evidence in the text supports your research focus. **

** 7. List at least two details or references from the text that will be useful to other members of your research group ** 1) On Page 73, Figure 3.3 presents an interesting double graph depicting trends in the budget of the MMS and Gulf of Mexico crude oil production in the years 1984-2009. While total revenues, and in particular those generated from ultra-deep (5000+ feet) operations have increased to their highest levels in real terms over the 16 year period, the budget of the MMS has essentially flat lined in recent years, and is about 20% below its earliest levels.

2) On Page 75, Figure 3.4 provides a graph of MMS inspections in the Gulf of Mexico in the years 1990 to 2009, including totals for both announced and unannounced inspections. Of note is the fact that the overall number of inspections has declined relatively consistently since the year 2000, by approximately 25%. In addition, the composition of these inspections has shifted dramatically, with the number of unannounced inspections declining from around 500 in 2000 to about 100-200 by the year 2009. The decline in announced inspections has not been quite as pronounced, falling from about 6,200 in 2000 to around 4,700 in 2009.