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 * Oil Alternatives: High-Speed Rail**

**Table of Contents:**

flat = = = = = ** Introduction ** =

Stemming from concerns regarding global climate change and a dependence on foreign petroleum, high-speed rail has emerged as a potential alternative to traditional modes of public and private transportation. In the United States in particular, the benefits of such a project are often viewed as being two-fold. In one sense, these undertakings may enable opportunities for increased economic growth through a reduction in travel times between major cities and corridors. For instance, the proposed California High Speed Rail project is expected to permit a travel time between San Francisco and Los Angeles of 2 hours and 38 minutes (California High-Speed Rail Authority- Interactive Map 2010), as opposed to 6 hours and 18 minutes by car (Google 2011). Additionally, if this infrastructure succeeds in diverting passengers from automobiles and planes, it may promote a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and in the use of gasoline as a fuel.

With the implications of such arguments, it is necessary to evaluate the strength of these claims within the context of current high-speed rail proposals. To permit this undertaking, we will examine two projects in particular: California High Speed Rail and Southeast Corridor High Speed Rail. While differing in scale and approach, these instances will help to illuminate the conflicting perceptions of optimism and skepticism which permeate the coverage of these endeavors.



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= ** Background ** =

Internationally, the first high-speed rail line was opened in Japan in 1964 between Tokyo and Osaka (James 2009, 1). Following the construction of a line between Rome and Florence in 1978, Europe has seen additional corridors sprout up in Spain, Germany, Belgium, Britain, and France. In recent years, China and Taiwan have experimented with this infrastructure, with maglev trains traveling as fast as 268 miles per hour (mph) between Shanghai and its airport, and 217 mph between Beijing and Tianjin (James 2009, 1-2).



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In the United States, the most significant example of high-speed rail has been Amtrak’s Acela trains in the Northeast Corridor, between Boston, MA and Washington, D.C. Implemented in the late 1990’s, these trains travel as fast as 150 mph between Boston and New York City, and reach speeds as high as 135 mph on the New York City to Washington, D.C. corridor. However, these routes average only 68 mph and 82 mph respectively over the course of the entire trip. At present, there are only five corridors in the United States on which trains have top speeds greater than 79 mph, and no exclusive high-speed rail lines, despite Federal funding of $4.17 billion for these projects between 1990 and 2007 (United States 2009, 10).



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With this history in mind, a major stumbling block for implementing high-speed rail in the United States has been its perceived lack of profitability. According to Japanese government figures, no high-speed rail lines other than the initial venture generated enough revenue to cover operating costs (United States 2009, 7). Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis conducted by the United Kingdom in 2007 estimated that a new high-speed rail line between London and Manchester would be unable to recuperate its construction costs on the basis of fares alone (Monbiot 2010, 2).

Additionally, significant structural differences may exist between the United States and those countries which have tended to adopt high-speed rail. For instance, many of these countries have higher population densities, lower per capita car ownership, higher gas prices, and greater levels of state ownership within the rail industry (United States 2009, 7). With substantial upfront costs in terms of both time and funding, these concerns have tempered the willingness of the private sector to invest in these projects.

However, in recent years, the United States government has devoted significant resources to help advance these undertakings. For instance, $8 billion was set aside for intercity passenger rail and high-speed rail projects under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009 (United States 2009, 1), and the Obama Administration has proposed an investment of $53 billion over a period of nearly 25 years to bring high-speed rail networks to 80% of Americans by 2020 (Kastenbaum 2011). Despite these gestures, there are questions regarding whether this funding will be maintained in the coming years. Recently, Congress cut all allocations for high-speed rail projects in fiscal year 2011, and rescinded an additional $400 million that was already allocated in 2010. Although these cuts are purported to not affect projects already underway, the loss of funding is estimated to amount to anywhere from $1.4 billion to $4.4 billion (Kastenbaum 2011).

(United States 2009, 2)

Additional questions abound regarding the ability of high-speed rail projects to adequately draw consumers from such alternatives as busses, automobiles, and planes. A 1997 estimate by the Federal Railroad Administration found that in most cases, only 3% to 6% of intercity automobile trips would be diverted by high-speed rail (United States 2009, 14). Similarly, a 2008 report by the Department of Transportation Inspector General found that cutting travel time along the Northeast Corridor by one-half of an hour would cut automobile travel by less than 1%. However, in the same 1997 study, it was argued that 20% to 50% of passengers may switch from air travel, and this figure was found to range from 11% to 20% under the 2008 study (United States 2009, 15). With the degree of uncertainty regarding potential ridership, careful attention must be paid to the assumptions of capacity utilized in estimating impacts on greenhouse gas emissions and profitability.

One last concern is that estimates of greenhouse gas emissions have excluded those generated in the construction of the infrastructure. For instance, one critique of the California High Speed Rail project argues that the net benefits in terms of carbon emissions will be only 1.5% of the state’s goal once these factors have been included, while an analysis of a line from London to Scotland estimates these savings at only 0.2% of total UK carbon emissions (United States 2009, 17). Similarly, it is clear that the emissions benefits depend in large part on the choice of fuel (diesel or electricity), as well as the sources from which electricity may be derived (coal, natural gas, or renewables such as wind and solar). If these factors are excluded, it is possible that there may be an underestimate of the impacts of these technologies.

= Context =

At present, the key actors have tended to be national governments, which have invested in these projects both domestically, as well as abroad through sovereign wealth funds and other initiatives. These institutions have drawn officials from a variety of sectors, including engineering, manufacturing, think tanks, and the policy making arena to formulate analyses which push forward the development of high-speed rail infrastructure. However, private actors have also been included in this process through a series of public-private partnerships (PPP’s). For instance, in France, half of the estimated $10 billion construction cost of the new Sud Europe Atlantique line will come from the private contractor VINCI, which has been given the right to collect track fees on the line in exchange for its contribution (Freemark 2010, 1). This has raised a new set of concerns, among them the tendency for corporations to engage in profit-seeking at the expensive of safety and competitive fares. Nonetheless, governments face a specific set of challenges which make this alternative appealing; among these are a recent decline in tax revenue, the tendency for political influences, bureaucratic delays, and the significant level of risk which must be assumed by the tax payer through the public sector. However, in Taiwan and the United Kingdom, private firms involved in these projects have at times gone bankrupt as a result of difficulty in obtaining loans at low interest rates, and have ultimately left the expense of this infrastructure to national governments (Freemark 2010, 1).

In addition to these principal actors, it is necessary to note other stakeholders that may be affected by a shift into high-speed rail infrastructure. For instance, residents of communities in the proposed path of this development may witness the destruction of the local environment, and be subject to a great deal of noise, congestion, and possibly air or water pollution resulting from the disposal of waste products. However, these same individuals may be afforded job opportunities in the construction or operation of rail lines and nearby businesses, and a greater ease of travel to metropolises.

Similarly, corporations located along major corridors of the United States may see significant benefits from reduced travel times between cities. The same 2007 report commissioned by the United Kingdom regarding the proposed line between London and Manchester found that business customers could recover as much as 17.6 billion pounds from a decrease in these times, and that leisure customers could see as much as 11.1 billion pounds in savings. These figures amounted to nearly twice the estimated 15 billion pounds that would be collected in fares (Monbiot 2010, 2).

Beyond these more direct stakeholders, it is important to note that substitutes such as light rail, automobiles, planes, and busses may be affected by the viability of high-speed rail operations. While a successful high-speed rail network may serve to reduce congestion at airports and on highways, it may also result in diminished levels of capacity which limit the profitability of these alternative modes of transportation.

Resulting from such a paradigm shift, it is clear that producers and distributors of petroleum may be adversely affected if the demand for vehicles which utilize these fuels is reduced, and may be forced to invest in a more diverse energy mix. In an analogous fashion, producers of electricity may be pressured to derive their energy from cleaner sources in the event that trains were to run on energy obtained from regional power grids, to ensure a more justifiable reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. This could require upgrades to existing infrastructure, as well as government subsidies to enable the purchase of the necessary capital for such endeavors as wind and solar farms. In this sense, it is possible that many of the long-run expenses which are required embed high-speed rail within a more sustainable future have been excluded from estimates.

In considering the broad trends which will likely affect the development of this oil alternative, it is clear that the following have a significant role to play in the coming years:

· The desire of constituencies to orient towards longer term goals of sustainability and infrastructure, rather than the short-term convenience afforded by the use of interstate highway networks and regional jetliners. This may be difficult at a time when many are concerned with rising rates of unemployment and the cost of preserving health care benefits in the near term. However, sustained increases in the cost of gasoline, when coupled with other measures such as carbon taxes, may help to shift this focus.

· The ability of politicians to extricate themselves from the influence of large oil and other infrastructure corporations, which is maintained through substantial lobbying efforts. Historically, this has proven to be nothing more than an idealistic vision, but perhaps these effects could be corralled through more stringent conflict of interest legislation, and external auditing of project financing.

· The nature of the technology available in the coming years, both in terms of the kinds of trains, as well as the implementation of alternative fuel sources and modes of electricity generation. In 2009, the United States derived 69% of its electricity from coal, natural gas, and petroleum (Energy Information Administration Electricity 2010). If high-speed rail is to truly reduce emissions relative to automobiles and planes, it is clear that these externalities must be included in the event that trains obtain their energy from regional power grids.

With these ideas in mind, consider the following three quotes, which demonstrate some of the perceptions regarding the viability of high-speed rail projects in the coming years:

1) “…Oliver Hauck, president of **Siemens Mobility USA ** … (articulated) his own company’s interest in accepting “ //some of the risk inherent in financing this major upgrade to the American transportation system // ” through a public-private partnership (PPP) … similar excitement about contributing private sector funds to the project have come from **French railroad operator SNCF ** and **JR Central **, one of Japan’s preeminent carriers” (Freemark 2010, 1).

2) “Metropolitan area size is a necessary prerequisite for high-speed rail, but not a sufficient indicator on its own of a successful corridor. Distance to other major metropolitan centers, richness of local transit service, economic activity, and existing travel demand are all important factors in identifying optimal corridors” (Hagler and Todorovich 2011, 2).

3) “New York City is also the only city in the country where more residents (55%) do not own an automobile than do. In most other large U.S. cities, the percentage is between 10% and 25%... the Acela trains running to and from New York City on the NEC are the only Amtrak trains that reportedly cover their operating costs” (United States 2009, 25).

= ** Project Analysis #1- California High Speed Rail ** =



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** Where is the project, and what are its key features? **

The project, which is expected to be located in central and western California, strives to ultimately link San Francisco, Sacramento, Anaheim, Los Angeles, and San Diego via a network of high-speed, electric trains which can travel as fast as 220 mph. In total, 800 new miles of track have been proposed, with as many as 24 stations along the line (California High-Speed Rail Authority- Project Vision and Scope 2010). An additional 880 miles of track will be upgraded, and 275 additional miles have been proposed but not officially included (CNN.com staff 2011). An environmental review is being conducted for each of the sections of the track, and the first stage between San Francisco and Los Angeles is expected to be completed by 2020 (Bradsher 2010, 3).

It is additionally suggested that various features of community development will be promoted, such as enhanced safety from a separation of tracks and roads, economic development around stations, and other forms of “transit- and pedestrian-oriented in fill development” (California High-Speed Rail Authority- Project Vision and Scope 2010). However, little information is provided regarding more specific plans of what is intended in the areas that surrounds the tracks.

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** Has there been any press coverage or research on the project? What has been of interest to other analysts? **

There has been substantial coverage of this project, both in the press and at research institutions. For instance, the California High Speed Rail Authority provides a list of articles which support the project on its website ( []), while news outlets such as CNN and the New York Times have published articles detailing features of the project ranging from sources of funding to a description of the proposed route (see Works Cited). In addition, bloggers such as Yonah Freemark have written on the nature of the public-private partnerships which may be pushed forward during the project (Freemark 2010), and UC Berkeley has conducted lifecycle analyses to attempt to determine the emissions impact of the project (Cosgrove Spring 2010). Other coverage has included an emissions study by the Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology (Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology 2006), as well as an evaluation of the project’s 2008 and 2009 business plans by the Legislative Analyst’s Office of the State of California (California 2010).

** Why is the project located where it is, and how has its location affected its development and impact? **

The choice of the project’s location has been to enhance the degree of potential economic and environmental impacts resulting from the implementation of high-speed rail. In the case of the latter, it is estimated that the project may reduce our dependence on foreign oil by as much as 12.7 million barrels per year, and greenhouse gas emissions by 12 billion pounds (California High-Speed Rail Authority- Project Vision and Scope 2010). For the former, the California corridor has numerous features which suggest that high-speed rail may attract significant ridership. In a study by America 2050, those which were highlighted as conducive to high-speed rail were proximity to metropolitan areas, distances between cities of 100-500 miles, existing transportation networks, high GDP per capita, significant auto congestion, and location within a “megaregion” (Hagler and Todorovich 2011, 2). Of the top fifty city pairs which were given in the report, nine had at least one terminus in the state of California, with the Los Angeles-San Francisco pair ranked fifth overall (Hagler and Todorovich 2011, 6). Also, it is argued by Freemark that the presence of “wealthy” residents in the state could enable it to sell development rights to the land which surrounds potential stations to recover billions of dollars of the upfront costs (Freemark 2010, 2).

** Who are the stakeholders, beneficiaries and losers in this particular project? **

Potential beneficiaries of the project include corporations which conduct business in multiple cities in the state, the politicians who proposed the project, foreign nations such as China, and more generally the citizens of California and the United States. While the case of the first two may be obvious, investments from foreign nations may help them to diversify their surpluses of foreign exchange in longer-term ventures, and will help to set a precedent for such projects in the future.

In addition, citizens of California, and especially those located near high-speed rail projects, may see a significant expansion of job opportunities, both in construction and in the economic ventures which arise from the project. It is estimated by the California High Speed Rail Authority that up to 100,000 construction-related jobs may be created in each year that building occurs, and that 450,000 permanent jobs could be created over the next 25 years (California High-Speed Rail Authority- Project Vision and Scope 2010). Less tangible benefits may also be offered, such as reduced congestion on highways and at airports, as well as faster travel time.

// Estimated Creation of Jobs for California HSR Project by Line: //



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For the citizens of the United States as a whole, pressures to “buy American” may create new manufacturing jobs across the country to provide the equipment necessary to further development. For instance, an initial licensing agreement between G.E. and China has called for at least 80% of the components to come from American suppliers, and for labor-intensive final assembly to take place in the United States (Bradsher 2010, 2).

The main set of potential losers is likely to be those corporations which are engaged with alternative forms of transportation, whether oil corporations, airlines, car manufacturers, or existing forms of commuter rail. While the project is likely to engage existing transportation networks on a smaller scale, it is unlikely that the frequency of flights or car trips between San Francisco and Los Angeles would be maintained if travel times were reduced so substantially. Additionally, pressures to get the power for the trains from renewable sources rather than diesel, coal, or natural gas could further hurt oil corporations, as well as operators on the power grid who cannot afford the capital investments necessary to effect this transition.

Other stakeholders that should be noted include the proponents, opponents, and potential users of proposed high-speed rail projects in other corridors of the United States. In these states and regions, it is likely that planners and politicians will look towards the California example to assess the feasibility of implementation, and whether the costs are justifiable in the long-run. Similarly, it is uncertain as to whether this rail service can be expanded to encompass larger scale, freight transport as well, and this application may be of significant interest to corporations across the nation. Last, politicians at the Federal level, and particularly the administration of Barack Obama, will be critiqued on the successes or failures of this project, with the emphasis that has been placed on these infrastructure projects both in their stimulus packages, as well as in longer-term allocations. Clearly their prospects of re-election will be affected by these outcomes.

** What kinds of expertise have been needed to advance the project? **

The members of the California High Speed Rail Authority Board include individuals with backgrounds ranging from political science to business, law, and engineering. Additionally, the CEO of the organization has been an engineer and manager at transportation companies. The expertise of think tanks has also been utilized to conduct environmental assessments, and academic researchers in Civil and Environmental Engineering, such as the previously referenced case at UC Berkeley, have been in great demand. Local leadership has also been leveraged to examine more specific impacts, and to spread awareness to the public concerning the details of the project.

** How has the project been funded? **

The cost of the project has been estimated at $43 billion for the initial segment from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Of this amount, $2.25 billion was provided by Federal stimulus funds, while $10 billion to $12 billion in private financing is expected. Further, the latter of these sources may include significant contributions from China, with additional support from Japan, Germany, South Korea, Spain, France, and Italy. The rest is expected to come from a combination of federal, state, and local government sources (Bradsher 2010, 3). In addition, $10 billion of state bonds have been committed to the project by California (Freemark 2010, 2), although the state’s debt crisis raises doubts as to the degree of public funding which may be ultimately included.

** What will create the most significant barriers to effective development of this project? **

The most significant barriers to developing the project will most likely include obtaining the degree of funding necessary to complete the initial phase, promoting the use of renewable sources which is a staple of the California High-Speed Rail Authority’s emissions argument, and determining the proper degree of public-private partnerships which will ensure that the infrastructure is used in large numbers. For instance, the California High-Speed Rail Authority has estimated that setting ticket prices at 50% of airline prices would increase annual ridership by twenty million over setting them at 83% of airlines (Freemark 2010, 2), while the UC Berkeley researchers have estimated that high-speed rail will only be more efficient than cars and planes from an emissions standpoint if it has consistently high occupancy or uses a low-emissions source of electricity (Cosgrove Spring 2010, 1). In this sense, one may wish to be careful to avoid too much private ownership, which could result in higher fares that do not capture as much of the market from alternative means of transportation.

** How, if successful, will the project provide an effective response to concerns about this sustainability issue? **

If successful, the project could provide significant savings in both emissions and use of foreign petroleum. As was detailed previously, it is estimated that high-speed rail in California may reduce our dependence on foreign oil by as much as 12.7 million barrels per year, and greenhouse gas emissions by 12 billion pounds (California High-Speed Rail Authority- Project Vision and Scope 2010). While small figures next to total 2009 U.S. oil imports of over 4.2 billion barrels (Energy Information Administration Imports 2010), the savings may be significant when aggregated over the expected use of the system. In addition, by emphasizing the use of renewable sources of energy in powering the trains, the project may help to spark a movement to remedy the continuing use of coal and other fossil fuel sources that persists in many locales. Although the degree of environmental benefits depends in large part on the means by which the project is built and operated, it seems possible that they may be substantial if the right choices are made.

= ** Project Analysis #2- Southeast Corridor High Speed Rail ** =

** Where is the project, and what are its key features? **

The Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor is located between Washington, D.C., Raleigh, Atlanta, and Jacksonville. The initial proposal is for an upgrade of the tracks between Washington, D.C., Richmond, Raleigh, and Charlotte to permit speeds as high as 110 mph, with average speeds between 85-87 mph along the route (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Project Description 2010). In contrast, the top speed along the line is at present 79 mph, with an average speed between 46-48 mph along the corridor. Additional features are stated as improved access to freight service and a possible multipurpose trail alongside the tracks (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010).



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** Has there been any press coverage or research on the project? What has been of interest to other analysts? **

There has only been limited coverage of the project in the media recently, with much of the focus on the stimulus funds which have been received by states such as North Carolina (Siceloff 2010 and N.C. 2010). Additionally, there was limited press coverage of the initial proposal in 2002, which falsely argued that the project may be completed by 2010 (Progressive Railroading 2002). As in the case of California, there have been studies of the emissions impact of high-speed rail in the corridor, including the previously mentioned Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology report (Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology 2006).

The project itself, in conducting a Tier I Environmental Impact Statement, has chosen to specifically focus on five criteria as goals for the project: improved transportation choices, easing of congestion, improving the safety and energy effectiveness of the transportation network, reducing emissions per passenger mile, and improving overall efficiency without causing significant environmental impacts (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Tier I 2002).

** Why is the project located where it is, and how has its location affected its development and impact? **

One of the main goals of the project is to relieve congestion on crowded interstates. According to one estimate, over 60% of the urban road miles of Interstate 95 are heavily congested, and Washington D.C. ranks among the top ten cities in the nation for congestion in terms of the Travel Time Index of the Texas Transportation Institute (Hagler and Todorovich 2011, 5). In addition, the U.S. Department of Transportation estimated that the project would generate $2.54 of public benefits for every dollar spent, and would be the only project of those that it had reviewed to cover its operation costs from fares alone (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010).

As a result of its location, the most cost effective application of high-speed rail in the corridor was found to focus primarily on upgrading existing infrastructure. This has limited the maximum speed of trains to only 110 mph, since higher speeds would require an electrification of the tracks. In addition, due to their location in many developed areas, stations will require additional security fencing and landscaping to ensure public safety (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010).

** Who are the stakeholders, beneficiaries and losers in this particular project? **

Beneficiaries of the project are likely to include commuters who are stuck on congested highways, as well as corporations involved in the shipping of freight, who may have previously had to utilize trucks to reach more distant rail lines or destinations. Since tickets are estimated to cost 20-22 cents per mile, as opposed to 22-75 cents per mile for air and 35-55 cents per mile for automobiles (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010), it is likely that there will be a significant diversion for local consumers. It is also estimated that economic impacts could be notable, with 31,400 one-year construction jobs created, 800 new railroad operating positions, and as many as 19,000 permanent jobs from a general expansion of economic activity in the corridor (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010). State and local governments may additionally benefit beyond the expected increases in tax revenues, through improved access to regional or national centers of government that could reduce delays of municipal projects in the future.

One set of losers may also be the inhabitants of local communities through which these projects progress, as well as environmentalists interested in preserving these landscapes. For instance, one recent editorial argues that construction of the rail network may result in the loss of 140-year-old oak trees, and a diminishing of the natural beauty in the area (Cooke 2011). Additionally, it is possible that trucking companies may suffer somewhat from the project, since freight services are stated to be difficult to access in some locales at present. Since the upgrades are limited improvements to existing infrastructure, it seems less likely that alternative forms of transportation will suffer to the extent of the California plan.

Other stakeholders that should be noted include regional governments, which will likely see improved tax revenues from the stimulation of economic activity, as well as those involved in high-speed rail projects elsewhere, who will consider whether the model utilized in the Southeast High-Speed Rail Corridor is more viable in the short-run than the California plan, which includes a substantial amount of new infrastructure. Since the project is more isolated within the region, however, it seems less likely that foreign stakeholders will play as significant a role as in California.

** What kinds of expertise have been needed to advance the project? **

Management and legislative expertise have been necessary to build the coalitions which have permitted progress to occur, such as that between Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia in 1994 to initiate development within the corridor (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Project Description 2010). In addition, significant expertise has been necessary to complete the variety of Environmental Impact Statements which have been commissioned. The North Carolina DOT Rail Division, Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation, and the Federal Railroad Administration have concurrently been responsible for the Richmond to Raleigh segment of track, and the credentials of listed contacts include a Rail Project Development Engineer, and a Manager of Strategic Planning with a Masters of Urban and Environmental Planning from the University of Virginia (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010). Public comments were also considered in the case of the Tier I Environmental Impact Statement, and 18 hearings had been held prior to the publication of the report, with certified court recorders necessary to process mailed statements (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Tier I 2002, 8).

** How has the project been funded? **

The cost of the segment of the project between Washington, D.C. and Charlotte has been estimated at between $2.6 billion and $7.5 billion, with costs for South Carolina and Georgia not yet determined (Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor- Frequently Asked Questions 2010). $545 million of this amount has come from federal stimulus funds awarded to North Carolina under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and the state has proposed providing up to $55 million in matching funds in the future (NCDOT Southeast 2010). Virginia has received an additional $45.4 million in federal transportation grants (NCDOT SENS 2010), and has proposed contributing up to $11.4 million in matching funds in the future. In addition to these contributions, a coalition between the two states and the Federal government is providing $713 million, with $520 million of it being applied to the Charlotte to Raleigh line (NCDOT Southeast 2010). Little information is available, however, regarding how the project plans to cover the rest of its estimated costs. Perhaps its smaller scale will permit it to rely on the $53 billion in proposed expenditures by the Obama Administration over the next 25 years to fill this void in finances, or it may take on debt in the form of government bonds which will be repaid through fares.

** What will create the most significant barriers to effective development of this project? **

It seems likely that the most significant barriers to the development of this project will be potential cost overruns due to project delays, and the lack of availability of funding to furnish the rest of the project. As was noted previously, initial estimates argued that completion may take place in 2010, which has clearly not been the case. In this sense, extensions for both construction and the evaluation of Environmental Impact Statements may lead to unanticipated expenditures. In conjunction with the uncertainty regarding the means by which funding will be obtained in the future, this may be a substantial impediment going forward.

** How, if successful, will the project provide an effective response to concerns about this sustainability issue? **

One estimate finds that carbon dioxide emissions in the Southeast Corridor could be decreased from about 550 million pounds per year to around 250 million pounds per year if the proposed high-speed rail plan was adopted using an IC-3 diesel powered train ( Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology 2006, 12). Of note is that emissions of carbon dioxide per passenger mile were found to be higher for this technology than for conventional bus or rail. Since each of these technologies, however, was found to be at least half as polluting as automobiles or airplanes, it may be more beneficial in the long-run to invest in a “transportation mix” which incorporates each of these elements ( Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology 2006, 10).

(Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology 2006, 10)

= ** Conclusion ** =

In light of the significant capital costs incurred in developing high-speed rail networks, and the great deal of uncertainty regarding potential ridership, it seems that an approach of caution may be warranted at present. Although the technology operates with a lower level of emissions per passenger mile in certain circumstances than automobiles and airplanes, it is clear that it will be difficult to meet the emissions targets while maintaining high enough fares to recuperate the costs of these projects.

In this sense, it may be more feasible at present to take the lower-cost approach of upgrading existing track, rather than constructing entirely new lines. For instance, one estimate places the average cost of such undertakings at about $7 million per mile, as contrasted with $35 million per mile for separate, high-speed tracks (United States 2009, 3).

Rather than relying on high-speed rail options as a panacea, the United States could instead integrate it into a “sustainability mix,” in which it is just one part of a broader solution. Without the necessary infrastructure already in place, such as electricity generation from renewable sources, more efficient construction techniques, and cleaner automobiles and trucks to move components, one is compelled to ask whether the net benefits will be sufficient enough to justify the billions of dollars in expenditure? Consider that between 1950 and 2000, U.S. rail operators abandoned 79,300 road-miles of less-profitable track to avoid bankruptcy (Rodrigue 2011). While high-speed rail may ultimately be necessary in the future to replace an aging infrastructure and to reduce carbon emissions, it may not be the most efficient use of funding for sustainability projects at present.



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= ** Works Cited ** =

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Cooke, Mary O. "True Rail Costs." // NewsObserver.com //. 2 Apr. 2011. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. 

Cosgrove, Christine. "Tracking High-Speed Rail’s Energy Use and Emissions." // UC Berkeley Institute of // // Transportation Studies //. UC Berkeley, Spring 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. 

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Google. "Los Angeles, CA to San Francisco, CA." // Google Maps //. 2011. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en>

Hagler, Yoav, and Todorovich, Petra. //<span style="color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">Where High Speed Rail Works Best //. //<span style="color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">America 2050 //. Regional Plan Association, 11 Jan. 2011. Web. 13 Apr. 2011. <http://www.america2050.org/pdf/Where-HSR-Works-Best.pdf>

James, Randy. "A Brief History of High-Speed Rail." // TIME Sponsored Archive //. Time Inc., 20 Apr. 2009. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1892463,00.html>

Kastenbaum, Steve. "U.S. High-speed Rail Program Hit by Deep Budget Cuts." // CNN.com //. Cable New Network, 13 Apr. 2011. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/13/high.speed.rail.cuts/index.html?hpt=C2>

Monbiot, George. "What's Not to like about High-speed Rail? The Case Simply Hasn't Been Made." Guardian News and Media Limited, 17 May 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/17/high-speed-rail-policy-carbon-emissions>

"N.C. to Get $545M for High-speed Rail :: WRAL.com." // WRAL.com //. 28 Jan. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/6903052/>

NCDOT. "SENS. WEBB & WARNER ANNOUNCE $45 MILLION IN PLANNING FUNDS FOR RICHMOND-to-  D.C. HIGH-SPEED RAIL." // Southeast High Speed Rail Association //. 25 Oct. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.southeasthsr.org/node/33>

NCDOT. "Southeast Seeks $347 Million to Continue Advancing High Speed Rail." // Southeast High Speed // // Rail Association //. 27 Aug. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.southeasthsr.org/node/26>

Progressive Railroading. "Southeast High Speed Rail Progresses Plans." Trade Press Media Group, Inc., 25 Mar. 2002. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.progressiverailroading.com/news/article/Southeast-High-Speed-Rail-progresses-plans--10706>

Rodrigue, Jean-Paul. "Rail Track Mileage and Number of Class I Rail Carriers, United States, 1830-  2008." // Department of Global Studies and Geography //. Hofstra University, 2011. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/usrail18402003.html>

Siceloff, Bruce. "NC to Get Only Tiny Share of Promised Rail Money." // Newsobserver.com //. 9 Dec. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/12/09/853500/nc-to-get-only-tiny-share-of-promised.html>

Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor. "Frequently Asked Questions." Feb. 2010. Web. 12 Apr. 2011. <http://www.sehsr.org/faq.html>

Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor. "Project Description." Apr. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.sehsr.org/history.html>

Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor. "Tier I, Draft Environmental Impact Statement." 5 Mar. 2002. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.sehsr.org/reports/RecommendRpt.pdf>

United States. Congressional Research Service. //<span style="color: black; font-family: Calibri,sans-serif;">High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States //. By David Peterman. 8 Dec. 2009. Web. 13 Apr. 2011. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf>

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