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1. Hammer, David. "5 Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Fatal Gulf Oil Rig Blowout | NOLA.com." //New Orleans, LA Local News, Breaking News, Sports & Weather - NOLA.com//. 05 Sept. 2010. Web. 24 Feb. 2011. . 2. Where does the author work, what else has s/he written about, and what are her/his credentials? David Hammer is a reporter for The Times-Picayune. He is a graduate from Harvard that writes on causes of the Gulf oil spill as well as government recovery programs.

3. What is the main topic or argument of the text? The main topic of this article is to show the five big human errors that all played a factor in multiple mechanical errors that finally resulted in one catastrophic failure.

4. Describe at least three ways that the main topic or argument is fleshed out. The first method that the main topic is fleshed out is by engineers working under BP for the design of the wells admitting that they did notice problems in the well design and could causes potential failure. They knew that the well wall needed 21 centralizers to keep the two pipes on center, but decided to only use 6 to cut costs. Another place at cutting costs that led to a failure is when the cement bond log was cast in place. The subcontractor in charge was Schlumberger and BP sent them home before the cement was finished being placed. If they stayed for the finish they would have taken the mandatory sample and realized that the cement was faulty, requiring a patch job. The last point that was disclosed was that the mud barrier was removed and instead of replacing it with heavy drilling mud, it was replaced with seawater.

5. What three quotes capture the critical import of the text? “In the [drilling] operation's final weeks, those cost concerns took over. On March 30, BP engineer Brian Morel, whose name is on the well design documents, wrote that "not running the tie-back saves a good deal of time/money." “It's not uncommon to convert an exploration well to a production well, but it wasn't something workers on this rig were used to. That left many crew members in uncharted territory.” “On April 18, Halliburton ran a new model of a cement job using fewer than seven centralizers. It showed a "severe risk of gas flow." But Gagliano didn't make a scene this time. He attached the report to an e-mail message to his clients. Three different BP engineers later testified they never saw the warning, which was buried on page 18 of the report. Guide said he didn't read the report until after the accident.” 6. Explain how the argument and evidence in the text supports your research focus. The evidence in the texts supports my research focus is that fewer barriers were placed which was impaired the gas’s safe pathway to the surface. Along the same lines, there were fewer centralizers placed in the cement which enabled the two pipes to have more room for error. After the cement was cast, it was not inspected for the proper integrity to withstand the oil pressure. In addition, the pressure test that was made was misinterpreted by the workers; too much pressure in the pipe will clearly lead to a pipe burst. The mud barrier was also removed and replaced with inadequate mixtures… which was seawater (compared to heavy drilling mud. Finally, the one mechanism that could have saved this terrible chain of preventable mistakes was the blowout preventer, which of course, failed because BP did not get it repaired, rather just turned it off. Great choices BP, really looking of for the wellbeing of everyone…

7. List at least two details or references from the text that will be useful to other members of your research group. “BP's man in charge on the rig until April 16, Ronnie Sepulvado, said he reported the pod's problems to Guide and assumed Guide would tell the feds. He didn't. And another federal regulation requiring the blowout preventer to be recertified every five years was ignored.” “Rig officials knew all along the blowout preventer had some leaks, notably in the yellow control pod that receives messages from the rig. But they didn't think it mattered. BP and Transocean officials said they were familiar with a federal regulation stating that if "a BOP control station or pod ... does not function properly" the rig must "suspend further drilling operations" until it's fixed, but they didn't think the regulation applied in this case.” //This case makes me wonder what certifications the rig officials actually have, seems to me they don’t have much common sense so I wonder what they do have.//